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JAPAN'S USE OF HER HEGEMONY

BY JOHN C. FERGUSON

IN the November, 1914, issue of this REVIEW appeared an article in which it was declared that the hegemony of Asia had passed from British into Japanese hands. This view has not been seriously disputed. It is important to enquire what use has been made by Japan of her newly-acquired hegemony. The first official statement in the matter was made by the Tokyo Foreign Office, after the publication of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, that "Japan's position vis-a-vis China has been considerably enhanced since the outbreak of hostilities in Europe."

That Japan has not confined her activities during the period of the war solely to strengthening her position in China is clearly shown by an announcement of the Ministry of the Navy as to Japan's naval assistance to the Allied Cause. In addition to ships in the Mediterranean and in the Suez Canal, Japan's activities were as follows: Indian Ocean, China waters, and about Singapore: Armoured cruiser *Iwate* (with Vice-Adm. Chisaka in command of the First Special Duty Squadron), two cruisers, and four torpedo-destroyers.

Penang: One gunboat.

Pacific Ocean and about San Francisco: One cruiser.

The Hawaiiis: One armoured cruiser.

The South Sea Islands: One gunboat.

Vladivostok: Battleship *Mikasa* (with Rear-Adm. Kawabara in command of the Fifth Battle Squadron). In addition, a marine corps is temporarily kept at Habarovsk to have custody of the captured warships.

Yangtsekiang: Cruiser *Suma* (with Rear-Adm. Yamaoka in command of the China Squadron) and five gunboats.

The patrol of the Pacific Ocean, of the Indian Ocean, of the waters of Malysia and Polynesia was assigned to

Japan exclusively after the early part of 1915. Her will was law from Aden at the southern entrance of the Red Sea to San Francisco and upon her was the responsibility for the maintenance of order and the repression of German influence. She rendered prompt assistance to Great Britain in the suppression of the mutiny at Singapore and her well-known determination to support her Ally had also controlling influence in checking any possible outburst of disorder in India. In all her dealings with her war-associates having Asiatic relations, Japan has been scrupulously careful to fulfil every obligation which her position involved and to refrain from taking any advantage of the adverse circumstances of the war to further her own special interests. Her hegemony, while indisputable, was directed to the furtherance of the general cause and to the defeat of the Central Powers. The European Allies owe a profound debt of gratitude to Japan for her share in the war.

But what of her dealings with her Asiatic partner, China? Has Japan been as careful in her relations with China as with her European Allies? Has she observed the same caution against using her power for the furtherance of her own "special interests" and has her "territorial propinquity" to China made her sensitive to the aspirations and hopes of the new Republic which threw off the shackles of absolutism in 1911? Japan and China are one in literature, in religion, and in racial development—*t'ung wên, t'ung chiao, t'ung tsung*, as is claimed by the ardent East Asiatic Society, *Tung Ah Huei*. Has this intimacy of relationship made Japan keenly sensitive of the responsibility of her military strength and has she refrained from coercive measures designed to further her own "special interests?" Has she cultivated a better understanding with China and has she used her power to restrain disorder and heal breaches? Judgment in the matter is left to the reader. I confine myself to a statement of what has happened since 1914.

On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war upon Germany, Germany having sent no reply to the Ultimatum of Japan. After Japan's declaration of war upon Germany, China fixed thirty miles of fighting area around Kiaochow as the limit within which Japanese forces should confine themselves in their operations against German defences.

Much correspondence between the Chinese and Japanese Governments ensued, but up to the present, this has not been published. It was mainly concerned with the landing of Japanese troops at Lungkow, their marching across neutral territory to Kiaochow and the forcible purchases of food and supplies from Chinese farmers en route. There was a strong protest by the Chinese Government against the actions taken by the Japanese forces, but finally, under pressure, China withdrew these objections. Lungkow is approximately 200 miles from Tsingtao, the port of Kiaochow. The Japanese troops which disembarked here marched across country to Weihsien which is about midway on the railroad leading from Tsingtao to Tsinan, the capital of the province. From this central place, troops were sent westward along the whole line of the railway and a considerable force was stationed at Tsinan. Eastward, the troops were moved for military operations against the German fortifications. By selecting Lungkow as the port of debarkation for her troops, Japan chose a method of exhibiting her troops to as many people as possible in the province of Shantung. It was not a military necessity which led her to choose this port, but rather the desire to spread her influence over the whole Shantung peninsula.

The German garrison of Kiaochow was obliged to capitulate and was carried off to Japan as prisoners of war. The small British contingent which had been cooperating with the Japanese in the attack was withdrawn and the entire control of Germany's former interests passed into Japanese hands. Everything great and small, definite and undefined, passed from Germany to Japan. Negotiations were continuous for several months between China and Japan on the general questions involved in the transfer, but were abruptly ended by the sudden and unexpected presentation of the Twenty-One Demands.

These Twenty-One Demands were handed to President Yuan by Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, on January 18, 1915, and mark an epoch in the relation of the two countries. It was intended by Japan that these Demands and the conversation with Yuan should be kept secret until China had given her reply to them, but early in February the full text of the Demands became known to British and American newspaper correspondents in Peking. It should be noted that these Demands were submitted while the

Japanese troops, sent to capture Tsingtao, still remained on Chinese soil. During the period of negotiations, troops, sent from Japan to relieve Japanese garrisons in China, arrived while the troops which they were intended to relieve still remained. It is probable that those troops were held in readiness to enforce compliance with the Demands, if found necessary.

After much parleying and many denials of the report that Demands had been presented, the truth was finally acknowledged and a Memorandum concerning them was handed to the Legations of Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States in Peking. This Memorandum contained only eleven demands and these were given publicity by the Associated Press in a despatch from Peking, dated February 17, 1915. Previous to the publication of the Eleven Demands, the text of the entire Twenty-One Demands had been obtained, and it is understood that both texts were presented to the Cabinet at Washington in its meeting of February 19th, 1915. About the middle of March the United States Government addressed a note to Japan, independent of Great Britain, France and Russia, inquiring from the Japanese Government the reason for the discrepancy in the text as communicated to the Legations and that furnished to the State Department by the Chinese Minister in Washington. This inquiry was replied to on March 22nd by Baron Kato, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The purport of this note and the reply has never been made public but it may be readily conjectured by referring to an interview between Baron Kato, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a correspondent of the Associated Press, February 28, 1915. In referring to Japan's policy in China, Baron Kato said that Japan had no idea of attempting any wanton encroachment upon the integrity of China or any other nation. Japan had ambitions which were altogether laudable, but he most emphatically declared that those ambitions did not include any desire to monopolize interests in China or in the Pacific. Her aspiration was to get that share of those interests to which she was rightfully entitled, without interfering with the interests of other nations.

These Twenty-One Demands were divided into five Groups. Group I referred to Japanese interests in Shan-

tung province which had been acquired by conquest of Germany. Group II had reference to Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; Group III to the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company; Group IV to the non-alienation of the coast of China. Group V was so remarkable that three of its provisions are quoted in full:

Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or more) of what is needed by the Chinese Government or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

So outrageous were the demands in Group V deemed that China refused even to discuss its contents. It was felt by the Chinese that the demands of this group bore a direct resemblance to the measures taken by the Japanese Government previous to the annexation of Korea. When the contents of this group were discussed by various governments with Japanese representatives abroad, the representatives explained that the Japanese Government had only presented them as desiderata and that they should be separated from the eleven demands which were duly communicated to the Powers. The most specious justification was made by Baron Kato in the Japanese Diet, May 22, 1915, when he said, "We had to see what China would say about this Fifth Group and there was, therefore, no necessity of communicating it. Later on account of the appearance of erroneous accounts of this group, Japan decided to

make the matter public." So strong was the opposition to Group V and also to Group III, which referred to the Hanyehping concessions, that Mr. Hioki clearly foresaw that it would be impossible to force the Chinese Government to consent to them. For this reason he presented a list of revised demands on April 26, 1915. In reply to these revised demands, a conference was held at the Board of Foreign Affairs, Peking, May 1st, when Minister Lu read to Mr. Hioki a memorandum and presented to him China's reply. This reply was most conciliatory in tone and substance. It agreed to almost all of the demands in the first four Groups with slight amendments in some cases, but in regard to Group V it stated that they all infringe China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other Powers or the principle of equal opportunity.

Shortly after China's reply had been handed to the Japanese Minister it became known that Japan intended to present an Ultimatum to China and to back up this Ultimatum by a show of military and naval strength. Before this project was finally decided upon by the Japanese Government, it was submitted by Premier Okuma and Minister Kato to the Elder Statesmen, who fully approved of it. On May 7th it was duly presented to China. It was a lengthy defense of what had been done by Japan in the discussion of the Demands and concluded with the following:

Therefore the Chinese Government should appreciate the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government by immediately accepting without any alteration all the articles of Group I, II, III, and IV and the exchange of notes in connection with Fukien province in Group V as contained in the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April.

The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock P. M. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the specified time, the Imperial Government will take steps they may deem necessary.

The filing of this Ultimatum caused consternation in Peking which was to all intents and purposes isolated by the European war from other friends. On the following day, May 8th, China gave her consent to Japan's final demand stating in her Note that this action was taken by her "with a view to preserving the peace of the Far East" or in other and plainer words, she acknowledged that she bowed before *force majeure*. As a result of the accept-

ance by China of the conditions of the Ultimatum, the Japanese Government officially announced on May 9th that the naval and military movement in connection with the Chinese situation had been cancelled. The details were hastily arranged and the final treaties and notes signed on May 25th. These Demands emerged as a direct result of the increased political strength of the military party on account of the defeat of Germany at Kiaochow and the participation of Japan in the protection of the interests of Western nations in Asia and on the Pacific Ocean. The gains of Japan may be considered under the four geographical groups into which the Demands were divided.

SHANTUNG

As to the leased territory of Kiaochow, it may be remembered that in the Ultimatum which Japan delivered on August 15, 1914, the second clause asked that Germany should "deliver on a date not later than September 15th to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." This promise was materially changed by the Note of May 25 which was as follows: "When after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the leased territory to China under the following conditions:

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a commercial port.
2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.
3. If the Foreign Powers desire it, an international concession may be established.
4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and property of Germany and the conditions and procedures relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration.

It will be noticed that by this Note, Japan reserves for her own exclusive jurisdiction a "concession." Every indication points to Tsingtao as the "concession" which it is

intended to retain. Tsingtao is the part of Kiaochow which the Germans developed into a city with good roads and many fine residences. Here is the terminus of the railway; here are the docks, government offices, and fortifications. It is the most valuable part of "the entire leased territory of Kiaochow."

In addition to Kiaochow, Japan acquired Germany's other rights in Shantung. These included the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, 256 miles in length. This was completed in 1904 and connects the port of Tsingtao with the capital of Shantung province, Tsinan. This railway has two short branches of 28 and 26 miles respectively leading to mining properties. Along this railway a body of Chinese railway guards had been maintained, but this was disbanded and Japanese troops were substituted for them. At all important stations, Japanese post offices were established. The collieries of the Shantung Bergbau Gesellschaft at Fangtse in Weihsien district, 102 miles from Tsingtao, at Hungshan in Poshan district, 168 miles from Tsingtao and Kinlinghsien with an annual output of nearly a million tons of coal were the property of the Railway and were acquired by Japan. At Tsinanfu, the capital, German interests were centered in one district and this was occupied by Japanese troops.

Two other important railway projects were acquired, one of approximately 200 miles to connect the Tsingtao railway with the Tientsin-Pukow railway at Yihsien, and the other of 230 miles length to connect Tsinan with some point on the Peking-Hankow railway, presumably at Kaifeng. These had been granted in 1908 to a German company. Besides these two lines, there is also the line northward from Weihsien to Lungkow or Chefoo of more than 100 miles.

An important step of Japan in Shantung was taken by changing the military administration to a civil one. This took place October 1st, 1917, and on that date the Tsingtao Civil Administration Act was published in the "Official Gazette" at Tokyo. The new Act created a Department of Civil Administration in the Tsingtao Garrison Staff Office whose business it is to look after all executive and judicial affairs excepting the Military Administration of the occupied territory in Shantung province. For this purpose, a Civil Administration Office was established,

and divided into two Bureaus: the Bureau of Railways and the Bureau of Communications. The system of Civil Administration thus established included altogether about 600 officials.

Simultaneously with the promulgation of this Act, the Government issued the following statement, setting forth the reasons for it:

After the Empire had occupied Germany's Eastern Asiatic military base in and around Tsingtao, the Commander of the Tsingtao Garrison was appointed to administer all affairs, both military and civil. As to the welfare of the people, the Military Administration Office was established to look after that, and as to the railways and mines, the Shantung Railway Administration Office looked after them. Since then, three years have elapsed; order now has been fairly well stabilized, and the people are enjoying a peaceful life. It was decided, therefore, to supersede the Military Administration by a Civil, in order to better the government, and to protect the industry of the people, of the occupied territory.

The important changes brought about by the new act were: (1) the establishment at a number of places outside of Tsingtao of Civil Administration Offices "in order to contribute to the welfare of the people;" (2) The substitution of gendarmes for the police that were formerly stationed along the Shantung Railway between Tsingtao and Tsinan; (3) The appointment of the Japanese Consul at Tsinan to the additional office of Civil Administrator, "so as to smooth the relationship between the Civil Administrative and Consular affairs." The final part of the statement issued by the Government is to the effect that: "The object sought in the Civil Administration in Tsingtao is to give assurance of security to the people, so that they can industriously pursue their daily toil, thus to put the cordial relationship between Japan and China into a firmer position. There is no intention in the least to alter the property or status quo of the occupied territory."

In the latter part of 1918, negotiations were carried on between the Terauchi Administration and the Tuan Chi-jui Cabinet for two new railway concessions. As a quid pro quo, China was promised the withdrawal of civil offices from Tsinan, Choutsun, and Fangtze, along the existing railway line from Kiaochow to Tsinan. However, on account of the unexpected termination of the European war, the Japanese Government was reluctant to fulfil its part of the contract as to these rail-

way concessions, and for this reason it was announced that the actual abolition of the Japanese civil offices in Shantung province would not be carried out. The Administration of Japan along the railway line and in all the chief centers between Kiaochow and Tsinan is similar in many respects to that exercised by Germany during its occupation of Belgium.

MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA

As a result of the treaties of May 25, 1915, the "enhancement of Japan's interests" in Manchuria is even more noticeable than that in Shantung province to which reference has been made. Apart from the agreement as to the leasing of "land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises," and as to Japanese subjects being "free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever," and as to the opening of "certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as commercial ports," the most notable "enhancements" were the extension of the lease of Port Arthur to 1997, the postponement of the date for restoring the South Manchurian Railway to 2002, and the fixing of the date of the expiration of the Antung-Mukden Railway contract as 2007. By this treaty Japan out-russianized Russia in her grip upon Manchuria. In addition to extension of railway interests, Japan acquired permission to select, prospect, and work coal and iron mines in six districts of Manchuria and three of Kirin.

As if these were not sufficient for her subjects, it was further agreed that "if foreign capital is required for building necessary railways in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first" and that "hereafter, if foreign advisers, instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first." The "necessary railways in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia" above referred to are the following five lines: (1) Changchun to Chaoyang; (2) Chaoyang to Jehol; (3) Kaiyuan to Hailung; (4) Ssupinkai to Chaoyang; and (5) Kirin to Hailung. A loan agreement for the construction of a section of the first of these five lines, viz., that between Ssupinkai and Chao-

yang, has already been signed with the Yokohama Specie Bank for \$3,400,000. The section is between Ssupinkai and Chengchiatun, a distance of about 52 miles.

THE YANGTSE VALLEY

Japan's influence in the Yangtse Valley has been extended but not to the extent desired and planned for. The central point of interest was the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company, the control of which was the object of Group III in the Twenty-One Demands. This Hanyehping Company consists of three enterprises: (a) the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, located outside of the city of Hanyang at the junction of the Yangtse and Han Rivers; (b) the Ping-hsiang mines, located in the western border of the province of Kiangsi, and connected by water route and railway with the Siang River in Hunan province; and (c) the Tayeh Iron Mines, located about 70 miles east of Hankow in the province of Hupeh. These three properties were originally under the control of Sheng Hsüan-huai, at one time head of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Co. and of the Chinese Telegraph Co., Director-General of Railways, and later Minister of the Board of Communication.

Previous to the incorporation of the Hanyehping Company Sheng Hsüan-huai had found it necessary to enlarge and develop the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, and in order to accomplish this result he borrowed additional German capital on the security of the Ping-hsiang Mines. These loans were intended for the erection of new blast-furnaces, but in the process of construction these loans were found to be inadequate and from time to time additional loans were secured from Japanese banks. Application was made to British, American, and French bankers for loans to complete the re-organization of the Hanyang plant, but in every instance the bankers of these countries insisted upon the control of the Works during the tenure of the loan. It was impossible for Sheng Hsüan-huai to agree to any foreign control, as the Works were considered to be a semi-official undertaking. Hence it was necessary for Sheng to devise a scheme by which he could secure the capital necessary for the enlargement of the Works while at the same time he retained undivided control.

This was accomplished by a development of the principle laid down in the first Japanese loan, viz.: that of forward sales. Sheng agreed that he would furnish, for a term of twenty to thirty years, an annual supply of iron ore on an amortization plan which provided for the repayment of principal and interest. As the needs of the Works increased Sheng made further loans from the Japanese, on the same principle of forward sales. The amount of iron ore thus pledged to Japan annually amounts to about 300,000 tons, and there is a provision by which a certain amount of pig-iron may be substituted for iron ore.

This arrangement with the Japanese was purely a financial one and did not cripple or embarrass the Tayeh Mines, which were able to continue the supply of all the iron ore needed by the Hanyang Works in addition to supplying the amount specified in the contracts with the Japanese.

No change occurred in the status of this Company until Group III was presented which demanded that "the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of the Company nor cause the Company to dispose freely of the same." This demand was refused and in its place there was an exchange of Notes in which it was agreed that "if in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese capitalists agree upon cooperation, the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese."

In addition to Japan's concessions for the building and operation of the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway of 87 miles, and for the operation of the Tungkuanshan Mines, near Tatung, in Anhui province, both of which were obtained before the outbreak of the European war, Japanese capitalists have secured since that time the right to operate the valuable iron and coal mines of Fanchang and Tao-chung, near Wuhu, and of the Fenghuangshan Iron Mine, near Nanking.

FUKIEN PROVINCE

In one aspect of the Twenty-One Demands affecting the province of Fukien, the United States was interested, as it is a comment upon an arrangement which had already been cancelled. After the visit of the American Fleet to Amoy, in its cruise around the world, negotiations were begun between the Bethlehem Steel Works and the Chinese Government for the purpose of loaning to China \$20,000,000 which would be used for the building of docks and a naval base at some suitable location on the China coast. After careful surveys had been made by Chinese naval officers it was decided that the best site would be at San Tuao, on the Fukien Coast. A contract for this purpose was duly signed. In the autumn of 1911 an American visited Peking and completed the negotiations for the loan to the Chinese Government for the building of its naval base and dockyards. Before work could be commenced the Revolution of 1911 broke out, followed by an increase in Japanese influence to such an extent that the Chinese Government felt obliged to decide not to proceed with its scheme of establishing a naval base. This decision automatically put an end to the American loan.

There was already no occasion for Japan's insistence upon assurances from the Chinese Government, but nevertheless these were sought eagerly, and in addition the straw man "of permitting foreign nations to establish on the coast of Fukien province, dockyards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases or other military establishments" was set up only to be ceremoniously knocked off its pedestal. The additional assurance was obtained that China has "no intention of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the afore-mentioned establishments." This was a blow aimed at America, although America's place in the scene was already vacant.

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The year 1916 was one of backing and filling as far as the active pushing of Japanese interests was concerned, but after the signing of that strange document, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, Japan began to take advantage of her "special interests due to territorial propinquity." China was sorely in need of money and ready to bargain away her birth-rights for a mess of pottage to satisfy her immediate craving. Whereupon a series of loans succeeded and the

funds obtained thereby were largely squandered in fatuous military expeditions sent by the Peking Government against southern provinces whose grievances should have been adjusted and not spurned. Since the establishment of the present Hara Ministry in Japan, it has been announced as a policy that the Japanese Government will "withhold such financial assistance to China as is likely in their opinion to add to the complications of her internal situation." It stated also that "loans supplied to China under the existing conditions of domestic strife in that country are liable to interfere with the re-establishment of peace and unity in China so essential to her own interests as well as to the interests of foreign Powers." This is a complete reversal and disavowment of the policy of the Terauchi Cabinet, and it is a just description of these troublesome small loans of 1917 to say that they added to "the complications of China's internal situation." Some of these loans will be merged eventually into the Four Power Reorganization Loan and others can be combined or refloated with new and more suitable security but for the moment they are sources of unprofitable irritation.

The above is a rapid and incomplete survey of Japan's use of her hegemony so far as China is concerned. In Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, in Shantung province, in the Yangtse Valley and in Fukien province, "Japan's position in China has been considerably enhanced." The reader may judge for himself whether or not this enhancement has been obtained by predatory methods. That it has been obtained at the cost of the goodwill of China cannot be doubted.

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